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Despite any factual evidence, the idea of a secret „Islamization of Europe“ is finding increasing support among different groups in Germany. Anders Behring 
Breivik, who killed seventy-seven people in the July 22, 2011, massacre in Norway, was partly motivated by such beliefs. A test of revised integrated threat theory 
as a framework for analyzing Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes in Germany. Symbolic and realistic threats are analyzed as mediators between different 
antecedents (in-group identification, ambiguity intolerance, clash of civilizations) and the dependent variable, conspiracy stereotypes. An online survey was con-
ducted with 355 respondents from Berlin. The findings indicate that respondents with higher education and left-leaning political orientation were less likely to be-
lieve in conspiracy stereotypes and threats. The structural equation model indicates partial mediation via symbolic threats for clash of civilizations and education 
on conspiracy stereotypes. Symbolic threats fully mediate the relationship between in-group identification and ambiguity intolerance on conspiracy stereotypes.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, public debate, pol-
icy, and media in Germany have frequently portrayed Mus-
lims and Islam as a threat to the Western World (Schiffer 
2005; Hafez 2007; Kluge 2010; Bielefeldt 2010). Numerous 
studies indicate a rise in derogatory attitudes and hostile 
actions against Muslims and Islam in European countries 
(Allen and Nielsen 2002; Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 
2011). Germany is no exception in this regard (Piper 2010; 
Brauns 2012; de Nève 2013; Zick and Klein 2014). How-
ever, whereas the rise in prejudices against Muslims and 
Islam attracts increasing attention, a relatively new mode of 
derogatory attitudes toward the outgroup has hardly been 
noticed, even though it has prominent supporters in the 
German blogosphere and public debate: the Islamophobic 
conspiracy theory (Benz 2011; Hafez 2013; Shooman 2014).
Islamophobic conspiracy theories are a relatively new phe-
nomenon, so little research is currently available. Analyses 
of public debate, media, and relevant websites indicate that 
the core of this relatively new narrative is the idea of a 
secret ongoing Islamization of Europe (Hafez 2013; Shoo-
man 2014). As with the popular thesis of a “clash of civili-
zations,” this process is purported to be driven by an 
asymmetrical Muslim population growth that has pro-
duced huge masses of unemployed and alienated individ-
uals, who in turn put pressure on Western societies through 
immigration (Huntington 1998). The idea of asymmetrical 
population growth due to Muslims having a higher fertility 
rate, ultimately leading to conflict, is frequently reiterated 
in the public debate (Foroutan 2012), online forums (Shoo-
man 2014), and the media (Kluge 2010; Bielefeldt 2010), 
and was prominently adopted and disseminated in the 
bestseller Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is abolish-
ing itself) by former politician Thilo Sarrazin (2010). In 
fact, a recent study reveals that the size of the Muslim 
population is overestimated all over Europe.1 
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1 Public estimates show German respondents think 
that Muslims make up 19% of Germany’s population, 
however, the actual percentage is only approximately 
6%. For more information, see: http://www.economist.
com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart-
2?fsrc=scn%2Ffb%2Fwl%2Fbl%2Fislamineurope
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Furthermore, some proponents of this narrative argue on 
popular websites that the “Islamization process” is sup-
ported by certain leftist politicians, yet concealed from the 
masses by deliberate media disinformation (Shooman 
2014). An orchestrated campaign with a hidden Muslim 
agenda is alleged to be behind this process, with the ulti-
mate goal of enforcing Islamic laws and rules in Germany 
and eventually dominating the entire Western world 
(Fekete 2011). According to Benz (2011), these increasingly 
popular conspiracy theories operate with a strong emphasis 
on ethnic/civilizational in-group identity, to which Islam 
serves as the significant outgroup. The “Islamization pro-
cess” is contextualized as part of a more comprehensive 
intergroup clash of civilizations resulting from the irrecon-
cilability of the Islamic and Western cultures (Schiffer and 
Wagner 2011).
The case of Anders Breivik clearly indicates the importance 
of addressing such conspiracy theories (Fekete 2011). Sev-
eral studies in other contexts indicate that belief in con-
spiracy theories is significantly associated with negative 
psychological and behavioral consequences, including 
prejudice (Mashuri and Zaduqisti 2013, 2014; Bilewicz 
2007; Imhoff and Bruder 2014; Swami et al. 2011), dis-
crimination (Bilewicz and Krzeminski 2010; Bilewicz et al. 
2013), and even political extremism (Bartlett and Miller 
2010). Knowledge about underlying social and psycho-
logical mechanisms that might foster belief in conspiracy 
theories is therefore practically important.
From a theoretical perspective, social psychological research 
on conspiracy theories is primarily concerned with explain-
ing the relationship between well-established psychological 
measures (such as anomie, authoritarianism, need for cog-
nition) and belief in various conspiracy theories (Webster 
and Kruglanski 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Wagner-
Egger and Bangerter 2007; Swami et al. 2011). However, 
some studies have started focusing on conspiracy theories 
as an outcome of intergroup processes (Kofta and Sedek 
2005). In this line of research, some studies indicate that 
in-group identification (Mashuri and Zaduqisti 2013, 2014), 
intergroup threat (Bilewicz 2007; Mashuri and Zaduqisti 
2013), intergroup conflict (Kofta and Slawuta 2013), and 
various inter-individual difference variables (such as per-
sonality characteristics and/or personal ideologies; Kofta 
and Sedek 2005; Kofta and Slawuta 2013; Bilewicz et al. 
2013) are related to belief in conspiracy theories.
To the best of my knowledge, no study has yet analyzed 
conspiracy theories involving Islam and Muslims as a con-
spiratorial group. Furthermore, most existing studies rely 
on correlational study designs, rather than assessing model 
fit criteria for measurement and structural models 
(although see Bilewicz and Krzeminski 2010).
This study therefore sets out to analyze Islamophobic con-
spiracy theories from an intergroup perspective. The con-
cept of conspiracy stereotype (Kofta 1995; Kofta and Sedek 
2005) is adopted to assess the strength of belief in Islamo-
phobic conspiracy theories within an intergroup per-
spective. The revised integrated threat theory (ITT; Renfro 
and Stephan 2002) is operationalized as an analytical 
framework to predict Islamophobic conspiracy theories 
using structural equation modeling. The revised ITT 
postulates that the more individuals perceive certain social 
categories as realistic and/or symbolic threats, the more 
likely they are to exhibit prejudice. According to Stephan 
and Stephan (2000), symbolic threats target to the values, 
norms, morals, or identity of the in-group, whereas realistic 
threats are associated with political and economic power 
and physical well-being. Realistic threats may include con-
cerns regarding material goods such as jobs and housing. 
Threat perceptions vary in relation to inter-individual dif-
ference variables (such as personality characteristics and/or 
personal ideologies). Numerous studies have confirmed 
these hypotheses (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, and Duran 2000; 
Stephan and Renfro 2002; Oswald 2005; Riek, Mania, and 
Gaertner 2006; González et al. 2008). In the German public 
debate, Muslims and Islam are frequently contextualized as 
symbolic and realistic threats (Schiffer 2005; Hafez 2007; 
Bielefeldt 2010; Kluge 2010; Foroutan 2012). In this study, I 
propose that the revised ITT is an appropriate framework 
for predicting conspiracy stereotypes as an outcome of 
threats and antecedents (in-group identification, inter-
group conflict, and ambiguity intolerance). Specifically, I 
propose testing whether intergroup threats mediate the 
relationship between the different antecedents and Islamo-
phobic conspiracy stereotypes.
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This study therefore contributes to research on the revised 
ITT by adding conspiracy stereotypes as an additional 
intergroup outcome. Moreover, the relationship between 
threat perception and inter-individual difference variables 
has yet to be fully explored, with Stephan, Renfro and 
Davis (2009) pointing to the importance of inter-individual 
differences in threat perception and asking whether people 
“with certain types of personality characteristics [are] more 
likely to perceive that they are threatened by out-groups?” 
(Stephan et al. 2009, 69). In turn, I propose to test ambi-
guity intolerance as an antecedent to threat and a distal fac-
tor to conspiracy stereotypes. Based on previous research 
(Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Wagner-Egger and Bangerter 
2007) and theoretical assumptions (Frenkel-Brunswik 
1949; Budner 1962; Morris 2000), I hypothesize that ambi-
guity intolerance is positively related to threat perceptions 
and conspiracy stereotypes.
1. Social Psychological Research on Conspiracy Theories 
Despite their increasing prevalence in popular culture, 
public debate, and politics (Goertzel 1994; Swami et al. 
2011), conspiracy theories are still largely neglected by 
scientific research (Anton 2011). Since 9/11, however, the 
growing popularity of conspiracy theories has been 
matched by an increase in social psychological research 
into them (Swami et al. 2011).
Conspiracy theories can be defined as explanatory frame-
works through which (real or fictitious) historical or con-
temporary events and processes are interpreted as the results 
of secretive actions conducted by multiple individuals or 
members of a social category (Moscovici 1987; Anton 2011). 
However, there are differences with regard to the group to 
which the conspiracy is attributed. Campion-Vincent (2005) 
identifies at least two subcategories of conspiracy theory: 
system conspiracy theories and minority conspiracy the-
ories. According to Moscovici (1987), minorities are prone 
to being considered collective conspirators, since the minor-
ity, by its very existence, can be perceived as a threat and 
capable of plotting against the established order and way of 
life of the majority. The anti-Semitic conspiracy theories of 
the Middle Ages are classic examples of conspiracy theories 
involving minorities. System conspiracy, on the other hand, 
is a relatively new phenomenon (Campion-Vincent 2005) 
(first encountered around the time of the French Revol-
ution) associated with powerful elite groups, such as inter-
national corporations, secret services, governments, or lobby 
groups, which are said to secretly seek greater power and 
dominance, whether on a local or global scale. Wagner-
Egger and Bangerter (2007) demonstrate that the two cat-
egories differ in their relationship to commonly tested 
psychological correlates. While both relate to fear and mis-
trust in existing social institutions and authorities, minority 
conspiracies are additionally predicted by political conser-
vatism and discomfort with ambiguity (“need for closure”). 
This is in line with Webster and Kruglanski’s finding of a 
relationship between conspiracy theories and a “need for 
cognitive closure” (1994). Abalakina-Paak et al. (1999) find 
that ambiguity intolerance (Frenkel-Brunswik 1948; Budner 
1962), a closely related concept to discomfort with ambi-
guity, is significantly associated with conspiracy theories, 
political conservatism, and prejudice. Furthermore, ambi-
guity intolerance is positively correlated with threat apprai-
sal (Bardi, Guerra, and Ramdeny 2009). Political orientation 
and ambiguity intolerance were therefore included as pre-
dictors of threat and conspiracy theories in this study.
Conspiracy theories operate with intergroup categorizations: 
the in-group (i.e., the believers of the conspiracy theory) is 
confronted with an outgroup that is construed as a collective 
enemy secretly planning and acting to harm the in-group 
(Mashuri and Zaduqisti 2013). The supposedly conspiring 
outgroup is perceived as a “collective agent” and attributed 
collective intentions as a “dangerous, potent and deceptive 
enemy” (Kofta and Sedek 2005, 42; Kofta 1995). On the basis 
of extensive research on anti-Semitic prejudice and con-
spiracy theories, Kofta and Sedek develop a conspiracy 
stereotype, which they define as (2005, 42):
A causal, holistic theory of an outgroup functioning, ascribing 
to its members: (1) a collective goal – a permanent, obsessive 
striving for power and dominance over other groups in general 
(and the observer’s ingroup in particular); (2) collective beha-
vior – a secret way of doing (e.g., engagement in plots, decep-
tion, subversive activities, acting in disguise), and (3) a high 
degree of group egoism and solidarity (high supportiveness for 
ingroupers combined with complete disregard for outgroupers’ 
well-being).
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1.1. In-group Identification
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) proposes 
that individuals tend to achieve or improve positive social 
identity by comparison to relevant outgroups. If the evalu-
ation of the in-group is favorable, the comparison can lead 
to a strengthening of social identity. However, if the com-
parison results in a negative evaluation of the in-group, one 
possible mechanism to re-establish a positive evaluation of 
the in-group is through derogatory views of the outgroup. 
Such a mechanism can be activated if, for example, the out-
group is perceived as a threat to the in-group due to a his-
tory of intergroup conflict.
Numerous studies provide empirical evidence for this 
phenomenon, showing that individuals with high levels of 
in-group identification are more likely to possess negative 
views of the outgroup and higher threat perceptions 
(Corenblum and Stephan 2001; Stephan et al. 2002; Riek, 
Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Renfro et al. 2006; González et 
al. 2008). The more individuals identify with their 
in-group, the more likely they are to be concerned with its 
interests and the more sensitively they are liable to react 
to possible threats (Branscombe et al. 1999; Brown 2000). 
In their study in the Netherlands, Gonzales et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that symbolic (but not realistic) threats, 
mediate between (ethnic) in-group identification and 
anti-Muslim prejudice. This finding is consistent with the 
meta-analysis by Riek et al. (2006), in which strong 
in-group identification is primarily related to symbolic 
threats.
In their study on anti-Western conspiracy stereotypes in 
Malaysia, Mashuri, and Zaduqisti (2013) show that higher 
(religious) in-group identification is associated with 
increased belief in conspiracy stereotypes and that anti-
Western outgroup derogation mediates the relationship 
between in-group identification and conspiracy stereo-
types. Furthermore, their study indicates that symbolic 
threats moderate the mediation of in-group identification 
and conspiracy stereotypes via outgroup derogation. In a 
subsequent study, Mashuri and Zaduqisti (2014) demon-
strate that in-group identification interacts with intergroup 
mistrust to predict conspiracy stereotypes via perceived 
competitive victimhood (Noor et al. 2008).
Based on these observations, I expect that in-group identi-
fication will directly affect conspiracy stereotypes and that 
symbolic threats will mediate between in-group identifica-
tion and Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes. 
1.2. Clash of Civilizations 
The original version of the ITT (Stephan and Stephan 
2000) suggests that a history of conflict (and hence the per-
ception of intergroup conflict) can have an amplifying 
effect on intergroup threat perceptions. Several studies pro-
vide empirical support for intergroup conflict as an 
antecedent of threat and subsequently of prejudice (Coren-
blum and Stephan 2001; Stephan, Stephan, and Gudykunst 
1999; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, and Duran 2000).
In the context of intergroup threat and Islamophobic atti-
tudes after September 11, 2001, it seems reasonable to con-
sider intergroup conflict as an additional antecedent of 
threat. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, Islam and Mus-
lims are frequently portrayed and perceived as a potential 
threat to the West in the media, public debate, and govern-
ment policy (Schiffer 2005; Hafez 2006). One of the most 
popular framings of this intergroup conflict between the 
West and the Islamic world, is the “clash of civilizations” 
theory, first postulated by Bernard Lewis (1990) and later 
modified and popularized by Huntington (1993). The 
essence of this theory is, as Huntington puts it himself, that 
after the Cold War, the “velvet curtain of culture” has 
replaced the “iron curtain of ideology.” In other words, 
according to Huntington, inter-civilizational conflicts are 
no longer ideological, geopolitical, or economic, but rather 
caused and maintained by cultural factors (Rizvi 2011).
The clash of civilizations thesis has been criticized for its 
essentialist and ahistorical view of civilizations, in which 
different civilizations, or rather world religions, are 
assumed to be the major driving force behind social iden-
tity, despite increasing support for the simultaneous rel-
evance of multiple social categorizations (Crisp and 
Hewstone 2007). The thesis was also criticized for con-
structing civilizations as monolithic and homogenous 
entities, with an unchangeable core essence shared and 
valued by its adherents (Casanova 2011). Additionally, 
empirical studies were unable to confirm the posited prolif-
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eration of inter-civilizational conflicts on a global scale 
(Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000; Chiozza 2002; Tusicisny 
2004).
On an individual psychological level, little research is avail-
able on the effects of the clash-of-civilizations narrative 
(Sidanius et al. 2015). It has been tested as a predictor of 
various intergroup outcomes, such as intergroup bias and 
support for different types of violence (Mostafa and 
Mohaned 2007; Sidanius et al. 2004; Sidanius et al. 2015), as 
well as threat perceptions (Stephan et al. 2009), but not yet 
as a predictor of conspiracy stereotypes.
In the German context, analyses of media coverage, public 
debate, and policy indicate that Islam and Muslims are fre-
quently narrated as the essential and significant alien out-
group in comparison to what is depicted as the modern, 
democratic, and tolerant in-group (Bielefeldt 2010; Kluge 
2010; de Nève 2013). In a representative study on attitudes 
towards religions, 51 percent considered Islam as a threat, 
and 80 percent perceived a clash of civilizations between 
Islam and the West (Pollack and Müller 2013).
Another study shows that this relationship is especially 
strong among participants with strong in-group identifica-
tion (Foroutan et al. 2014). A similar relationship between 
in-group identification and perceiving a clash-
of-civilizations intergroup conflict was found by Sidanius 
et al. (2004) in their study on Arab attributions for the 
intergroup conflict between the West and the Islamic 
world. Their results indicate that the participants (Chris-
tian Lebanese) who showed higher in-group identification 
were more likely to attribute the 9/11 attacks to a clash-
of-civilizations conflict. In turn, respondents with lower 
in-group identification attributed the attacks more to an 
anti-dominance struggle.
With regard to Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes, analy-
sis of the Islamophobic conspiracy theories on relevant 
websites indicates that the elements and figures of an inter-
group conflict along the lines of a clash of civilizations are 
frequently used to support the idea of an ongoing secret 
Islamization of Germany (Benz 2011; Schiffer and Wagner 
2011; Shomann 2014).
On the basis of these findings, I expect that stronger 
endorsement of a clash-of-civilizations type of intergroup 
conflict will be significantly associated with in-group identi-
fication. Because the clash narrative is an explanatory frame-
work that posits intergroup value-differences as the root of 
the conflict and not, for instance, economical or geopolitical 
reasons, I expect it to be primarily related to symbolic threat 
perceptions. Therefore, I assume that endorsement of a clash-
of-civilizations intergroup conflict will predict conspiracy 
theories directly as well as indirectly via symbolic threat.
1.3. Ambiguity Intolerance
The concept of ambiguity intolerance was established by 
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), whose works were closely related 
to the works on the authoritarian character (Adorno et al. 
1950). Frenkel-Brunswik defines ambiguity intolerance as 
the “tendency to resort to black-white solutions, to arrive at 
premature closure as to valuative aspects, often at the 
neglect of reality, and to seek for unqualified and unam-
biguous overall acceptance and rejection of other people” 
(1949, 115). Since Frenkel-Brunswik’s first definition of the 
concept, it has undergone several reformulations, and dif-
fering measurement scales have been developed (Furnham 
and Marks 2013). One of the most commonly used scales 
for assessing ambiguity intolerance was developed by 
Budner (1962). Budner defines ambiguity intolerance as 
“the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as sources 
of threat” (Budner 1962, 29) whereas tolerance for ambi-
guity is defined as “the tendency to perceive ambiguous 
situations as desirable” (ibid.). According to Budner, situ-
ations are ambiguous if they are complex, ambivalent, insol-
uble, and/or new. In turn, individuals with a high ambiguity 
intolerance tend to show aversive reactions, such as dis-
comfort, stress, delay, avoidance, and so on when confronted 
with ambiguous situations or information (Budner 1962; 
Furnham and Marks 2013). Accordingly, I believe ambiguity 
intolerance to be a valuable concept for understanding 
inter-individual differences in reactions towards Islam and 
Muslims among non-Muslim Germans. Individuals with 
high levels of ambiguity intolerance could perceive the pres-
ence of Islam and Muslims and their increasing visibility in 
German society as ambiguous, as it challenges traditional 
understandings of the in-group and requires new and more 
complex narratives of the in-group, eventually leading to 
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threat perceptions. As Muslims are frequently portrayed in 
public debate and the media as a significant outgroup and 
possible threat, individuals with high ambiguity intolerance 
could tend towards an overall rejection of Islam and Mus-
lims by generalizing negative aspects of individual behavior 
onto the whole outgroup. As Kofta and Sedek (2005, 42) 
note, this generalization process is in line with research 
showing that people interpret intergroup relations similarly 
to interpersonal relations (Alexander, Brewer, and Hermann 
1999) by perceiving social categories not as static entities 
but as dynamic and “collective agents” (Morris 2000), which, 
when attributed with collective intentions of a malicious 
and deceptive nature, constitute a conspiracy stereotype.
Several studies show that ambiguity intolerance is posi-
tively related to prejudice and authoritarian character 
(Adorno et al. 1950; Sidanius 1978; Watson and Morris 
2005), and threat appraisal (Bardi, Guerra, and Ramdeny 
2009). Furthermore, ambiguity intolerance and the closely 
related concept of  discomfort for ambiguity have been 
linked to belief in conspiracy theories (Webster and Krug-
lanski 1994; Abala kina-Paak et al. 1999, Wagner-Egger and 
Bangerter 2007). Thus, I expect higher ambiguity intoler-
ance to be associated with higher threat perceptions and a 
stronger belief in conspiracy stereotypes. Furthermore, I 
expect threats to mediate between ambiguity intolerance 
and Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes.
1.4. Hypotheses
 H1: Political orientation towards the right will be signifi -
cant ly and positively associated with conspiracy stereotypes.
H2: Reported in-group identification and the belief in clash 
of civilizations will be positively significantly related to 
each other.
H3: In-group identification will have significant positive 
direct and indirect effect (the latter via symbolic threats) 
on conspiracy stereotypes.
H4: The belief in clash of civilizations will have a sig-
nificant positive direct and indirect effect (the latter via 
symbolic threats) on conspiracy stereotypes.
H5: Ambiguity intolerance will have a direct and indirect 
effect (the latter via threats) on conspiracy stereotypes.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Data acquisition was conducted via an online survey 
(Unipark) advertised through channels including univer-
sity email lists, university bulletin boards, and social media. 
The survey announcement and starting page specified that 
participants must be German residents and that par-
ticipation was voluntary and anonymous. The possibility of 
winning a prize was offered as an incentive (iPod, iPhone, 
and iPad). The data collection took place between June and 
August 2014. After removing all non-native and all Muslim 
respondents, as well as all respondents with any missing 
values, a total of N = 355 German-resident, non-Muslim 
participants completed the survey without missing values. 
In the final sample, 203 participants were female (57.2 per-
cent), and 152 male (42.8 percent). The ages of the partici-
pants ranged from 18 to 36 years (M = 25.43, SD = 4.12).2
2.2. Measures
The survey consisted of a demographic section (age, 
gender, education, migration background, political orien-
tation, and religion) and a section including the following 
measurement instruments (predictors): in-group identifi-
cation, clash of civilizations, and ambiguity intolerance. 
Realistic and symbolic threats were included as mediators. 
Anti-Islamic conspiracy stereotypes were measured as a 
dependent variable and were included after the previously 
mentioned survey sections.
2.2.1. Predictor Variables
Identification with the (national) in-group was measured, as 
in similar previous studies (Verkuyten 2005), using three items 
2 This paper presents the results of a multipart 
online survey. The results of this paper are based on 
the second part of the survey. All participants of this 
study completed survey number one prior to the 
survey of this study. The first survey included the 
following measures: Social Dominance Orientation 
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999), intergroup threats, anti-
Muslim prejudice and anti-Islamic sentiment. 
Demographic informations of the participants are 
taken from the first part of the survey. All other 
measures used in this study were part of the second 
part of the survey. 
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from the collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen and Crocker 
1992): “My German identity is an important part of myself”; 
“Being German is a very important part of how I see myself”; 
and “I am proud to be a German”). All items were mea sured 
on a five-point scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) 
“strongly agree.” Higher scores indicate stronger in-group 
identification. Cronbach’s α for the three-item scale is .73.
Tolerance of ambiguity was assessed using six items from 
the scale developed by Budner (1962). Examples include: 
“What we are used to is always preferable to what is 
unfamiliar”; and “The sooner we all acquire similar values 
and ideals, the better.” All items were measured on a five-
point scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) 
“strongly agree.” Cronbach’s α for the six-item scale is .72.
Clash-of-civilizations intergroup conflict was assessed by 
four items, adapted for the German context from the study 
by Sidanius et al. (2004). They capture (a) the endorsement 
of the existence of a currently ongoing clash of civilizations, 
in general, and (b) the perception of a clash of cultures 
between Islam (essentialized and monolithic) and the West 
in particular. The items included “We are currently facing a 
‘clash of civilizations’”; “The Islamic culture is inherently 
incompatible with modernity”; “Islam is not compatible 
with democracy and human rights”; and “Islam has to mod-
ernize itself, otherwise there can be no peaceful coexist-
ence”. Pre-test interviews were conducted to assess the 
reliability and validity of the construct, and the assessment 
showed overall good values.3 The participants responded on 
a four-point scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) 
“strongly agree.” Cronbach’s α for the four-item scale is .84.
2.2.2. Threats
Symbolic and realistic threats were adapted from Stephan 
et al. (1999, 2000, 2002). All threats were measured on a 
five-point scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) 
“strongly agree.”
Realistic threats were measured using five items addressing 
economic and political threats from Islam and Muslims 
(including “The welfare system in Germany is increasingly 
burdened by the presence of Muslims”; “The Muslims in Ger-
many threaten our economic wealth”; and “Islam threatens 
security in Germany”). Cronbach’s α for the scale is .93.
Symbolic threats were measured using seven items, includ-
ing: “I am worried that … ” (a) “ … German norms and 
values are threatened by the presence of Muslims”; (b) “ … 
our rights and freedom are threatened by the presence of 
Muslims”; and (c) “ … German identity is threatened by the 
large numbers of Muslims in Germany.” Cronbach’s α for 
the scale is .95.
2.2.3. Dependent Variable
Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes were constructed using 
formulations similar to those of Kofta and Sedek (2005) 
and were measured using four items: “Muslims are secretly 
plotting to achieve an Islamization of Germany”; “Actually, 
Muslims are striving to establish sharia in Germany”; 
“Islam is conspiring against the West”; and “Muslims are 
planning to Islamize the West step by step.”) on a five-point 
scale ranging from (1) “definitely false” to (5) “ definitely 
true.” Cronbach’s α for the scale is .95.
2.3. Analysis
The aim of this study is to test the revised integrated threat 
theory (ITT; Stephan and Renfro 2002) for explaining Isla-
mophobic conspiracy stereotypes. The results will be pres-
ented in four sections. First, descriptive results for the 
measured scales (additive) will be presented. Second, the 
results for the confirmatory factor analyses, which assess the 
fit of the observed variables to their respective latent con-
structs, will be given. Third, the findings regarding the rela-
tionships between the different constructs and model fit of 
the structural model will be shown. Fourth, the results of the 
mediation analysis will conclude. Following the procedure of 
Gonzales et al. (2008), the measurement and structural 
model were fitted by maximum likelihood, assuming multi-
variate normality using Amos (Version 22). Any surveys 
with missing values were removed from the sample. The 
resulting final sample (N = 355) included no missing values.
3 See the results section for detailed information.
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3. Results
3.1. Descriptive Results
The mean scores, standard deviations, and intercorrelations 
among all the variables are shown in Table 1. Overall, the 
mean scores for all scales were below their respective neu-
tral mean values. The mean scores varied slightly by gender, 
with male participants showing significantly higher mean 
scores than female participants for both threats and ambi-
guity intolerance. When age was used as a control variable 
in the statistical analysis, no significant difference was found 
for any variable. Overall, symbolic threats showed higher 
mean values than realistic threats. Higher education is sig-
nificantly and negatively related to both threats and con-
spiracy stereotypes. As expected (H1), political orientation 
towards the right (1 = left / 5 = right) is positively related to 
conspiracy stereotypes (r = .35, p < .01) and to symbolic (r = 
.35, p < .01) and realistic threats (r = .34, p < .01). Fur-
thermore, in line with H2, clash of civilizations was sig-
nificantly related to in-group identification (r = .49, p < .01). 
Overall, the mean scores for threat perceptions and belief 
in conspiracy theories suggest that the sample subjects 
show a low level of threat perception and belief in con-
spiracy stereotypes.
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the variables (N= 355)
1. In-group identification
2. Clash of Civilizations
3. Ambiguity Intolerance
4. Political Orientation
5. Education
6. Symbolic Threats
7. Realistic Threats
8. Conspiracy Stereotype
M
2.48
2.03
2.00
2.14
5.35
1.52
1.34
1.67
(SD)
0.93
0.73
0.60
0.75
1.29
0.82
0.68
0.97
(Scale)
(1–5)
(1–4)
(1–5)
(1–5)
(1–8)
(1–5)
(1–5)
(1–5)
1
–
.49**
.40**
.49**
-.09
.55**
.49**
.52**
2
–
.32**
.35**
-.14**
.67**
.55**
.67**
3
–
.22**
-.23**
.49**
.53**
.44**
4
–
-.06
.35**
.34**
.35**
5
–
-.23**
-.28**
-.27**
6
–
.79**
.77**
7
–
.66**
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
All the measures show significant intercorrelation in the 
expected direction (Table 1). High intercorrelations can 
indicate multicollinearity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
analyses yields 3.20 as the highest VIF value. According to 
Myers (1990), VIF values smaller than 10 indicate that 
there is no serious problem with regard to multicollinearity.
3.2. Measurement Model
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed 
including all the proposed constructs (with Amos 22.0), to 
assess the construct validity4 of the individual variables 
and model fit indices for the proposed measurement 
model.5 The convergent validity and discriminant validity 
4 The validity of the clash-of-civilizations scale, 
which was adapted and modified for this study, was 
analyzed during the CFA analysis. Acceptable dis-
criminant validity is indicated by factor correlations 
< .80 (Brown 2006) and convergent validity by factor 
loading values > .60 (Garson 2010). The results show 
good discriminant validity (factor correlations rang-
ing between .50 and .76) and good convergent valid-
ity (standardized regression weights for the factor 
loadings ranging between .62 and .84, p < .001).
5 The results of an initial CFA revealed that the 
In-group Identification scale (Luhtanen and Crocker 
1992) and Tolerance of Ambiguity scale (Budner 
1962) did not fit the data well. Therefore, a series of 
confirmatory factor analyses (AMOS) were con-
ducted to shorten the scales.  
The full Tolerance of Ambiguity scale, consisting of 
sixteen items, did not fit the data well, χ2 (584) = 
1313.556, p < .01 (CFI = .93, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = 
.05). The items were analyzed for their factor score 
to uniqueness ratio, and the six items with the hig-
hest ratio were selected. The final six-item scale (two 
items for each of the three subscales) fits the data 
well, χ2 (289) = 753.373, p < .01 (CFI = .97, SRMR = 
.04, RMSEA = .05). The chi-square difference test 
was significant, indicating that the short scale is a 
better fit to the data, χ2diff. (295) = 699.429, p < .001.  
The full In-group Identification scale, consisting of 
five items, did not fit the data well, χ2 (289) = 
693.587, p < .01 (CFI = .96, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = 
.06). The items were analyzed for their factor score 
to uniqueness ratio, and the three items with the 
highest ratio were selected. The final three-item 
scale fits the data well, χ2 (241) = 571.405, p < .01 
(CFI = .97, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .05). The chi-
square difference test was significant, indicating that 
the short scale is a better fit to the data, χ2diff. (48) = 
122.182, p < .001.
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(CFA) of the constructs are verified when the results indi-
cate a good model fit (Brown 2006). Following the sugges-
tions of Hu and Bentler (1999), the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMS) were employed as 
absolute fit indices, and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
was employed as a comparative fit index. Conservatively 
speaking, a good fit of the data is indicated by an RMSEA 
value of less than 0.05, an SRMSR value of less than 0.08, 
and CFI values of 0.95 or higher (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
Table 2 shows that the CFA with a six-factor oblique sol-
ution, in which all constructs were allowed to correlate 
with each other, showed an acceptable absolute and com-
parative fit to the data. The six-factor oblique model had a 
significantly better fit to the data than the six-factor ortho-
gonal model, with independent constructs [χ2diff. (9) = 
434.939, p < .001] or the one-factor model [χ2diff. (15) = 
1697.939, p < .001].
Models
Six-factor oblique
Six-factor orthogonal
One factor
Fit Indices
χ2
763.487
1.198.426
2.461.282
df
362
371
377
RMSEA
.050
.070
.111
SRMR
.044
.070
.248
CFI
.96
.91
.78
ings were statistically significant (p < .001), and the stan-
dardized factor loadings were between .40 and .95.
3.3. Structural Model
The proposed structural model shows a good fit to the data 
(χ2 = 622.427; p < .001; df = 379; χ2/df = 1.64; CFI = 97; 
SRMR = .044 and RMSEA = .043 with 90% CI = .037 – 
.049). Figure 1 shows the results of a saturated model, in 
which all pathways, direct as well as indirect, were esti-
mated simultaneously. Education was entered as a control 
variable. The figure depicts the estimated standardized 
coefficients of the direct pathways. As expected, in-group 
identification had a significant effect on symbolic threats, 
and a smaller, but also significant effect on realistic threats 
(H3). However, unexpectedly, in-group identification had 
no significant direct effect on conspiracy stereotypes (H3). 
As hypothesized, clash of civilizations had a significant 
positive effect on both types of threats and on conspiracy 
stereotypes (H4).
Table 2: Comparison of Fit Indices of the First Model (Six-Factor Oblique), 
the Second Model (Six-Factor Orthogonal), and the Third Model (One Factor)
In order to improve the model fit indices for the final six-
factor oblique model, error items of the same latent con-
structs, but not between items measuring different latent 
constructs, were allowed to covary, resulting in the respe-
cification of nine parameters in total: one residual covari-
ance for symbolic threats; three residual covariances for 
realistic threats and three for ambiguity intolerance; one 
residual covariance for in-group identification and one for 
conspiracy stereotypes. The model χ2 of 565,225 indicates a 
lack of an absolute fit (p < .001), which is not uncommon 
for larger sample sizes. However, all the other fit measures 
indicate that the model has a good model fit: χ2 /df = 1.64; 
CFI = 97; SRMR = .044, and RMSEA = .041 and 90% CI = 
.035 – .047. The z-statistics obtained for all the factor load-
Thus, as predicted, the endorsement of the existence of a 
clash of civilizations was associated with higher levels of 
threat perceptions and conspiracy stereotypes. Ambiguity 
intolerance also showed positive significant effects on both 
types of threat, as expected (H5). However, no significant 
effect on the dependent variable was found (H5).
Figure 1: Path diagram model with estimated standardized coefficients 
with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
Note: Non-significant paths are marked grey.
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To assess the mediating role of the threats on the relation-
ships between the three predictor variables and the depend-
ent variable, the total effects of the predictors were further 
decomposed into direct and indirect effects. Table 3 shows 
that for clash of civilizations, the direct and indirect pathways 
are significant, indicating partial mediation through sym-
bolic threat. Partial mediation through symbolic threat is also 
suggested for education. The indirect pathways of in-group 
identification and ambiguity intolerance through symbolic 
threat are significant, thus suggesting full mediation.
Table 3: Decomposition of unstandardized and standardized direct and indirect effects on conspiracy stereotypes,  
with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
Education
In-group Identification
Clash of Civilizations
Ambiguity Intolerance
Symbolic Threats
Realistic Threats
Total Effects
Unstandardized
-.111 (.033)
.150 (.078)
.994 (.143)
.490 (.195)
.559 (.118)
-.030 (.137)
Standardized
-.146 (.043)
.138 (.070)
.567 (.067)
.200 (.070)
.473 (.103)
-.020 (.089)
Direct Effects
Unstandardized
-.081 (.027)
.059 (.065)
.594 (.146)
.186 (.188)
.559 (.137)
-.030 (.118)
Standardized
-.106 (.035)
.054 (.059)
.339 (.077)
.076 (.072)
.473 (.103)
-.020 (.089)
Indirect Effects
Unstandardized
-.030 (.016)
.091 (.040)
.400 (.093)
.304 (.115)
Standardized
-.040 (.021)
.083 (.036)
.228 (.050)
.124 (.045)
The explained variance of endogenous variables is indi-
cated by the squared multiple correlations value. The path 
model of the full model accounts for 71 percent [.71, 95% 
CI (0.628, 0.768) p = .003] of the variance in Islamophobic 
conspiracy stereotypes.
4. Discussion
The main objectives of this study were threefold: First, to test 
the revised integrated threat theory as an analytical frame-
work for predicting belief in Islamophobic conspiracy 
stereotypes. Second, following the suggestions of Stephan et 
al. (2009), to test whether the personality characteristic ambi-
guity intolerance (Frenkel-Brunswik 1949; Budner 1962) had 
an influence on threat perception and/or conspiracy stereo-
types. Third, to test the clash-of-civilizations intergroup con-
flict as an additional antecedent to threats and conspiracy 
stereotypes. It was proposed that symbolic threats will 
mediate between the relevant antecedents (in-group identifi-
cation, clash-of-civilizations intergroup conflict and ambi-
guity intolerance) and Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes. 
On the basis of previous findings (Wagner-Egger and Ban-
gerter 2007; Abalakina-Paak et al. 1999), I predicted ambi-
guity intolerance and right-leaning political orientation to 
be predictors of belief in conspiracy theories. The results of 
this study confirm that political conservatism is statistically 
related to Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes. Fur-
thermore, on the basis of theoretical assumptions (Budner 
1962) and previous empirical findings (Bardi et al. 2009), I 
expected a direct effect of ambiguity intolerance on threat 
perceptions. The results suggest no direct effect of ambi-
guity intolerance on conspiracy stereotypes. As expected, 
ambiguity intolerance was directly related to both types of 
threat perception and, via symbolic threat, to conspiracy 
stereotypes. This confirms the role of ambiguity intolerance 
in explaining conspiracy theories as an intergroup outcome. 
As expected, individuals with high ambiguity intolerance 
appear to be more open to intergroup threat perceptions 
and, via symbolic threat, to believing that Islam and Mus-
lims represent a collective enemy with a secret plan to harm 
the in-group. Therefore, this study supports considering 
personality characteristics in explaining the inter-individual 
differences in threat perception and subsequently, the dif-
ferent intergroup outcome variables for conspiracy stereo-
types, as suggested by Stephan et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, following the findings of Mashuri and Zada-
quisti (2013, 2014), in-group identification (ethnic) was 
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expected to be statistically related to conspiracy stereotypes. 
Building on previous research (Riek et al. 2006), in-group 
identification was further expected to relate primarily to 
symbolic threat. The results of the structural equation 
model confirm that in-group identification is significantly 
and primarily related to symbolic threats. However, no 
direct effect on conspiracy stereotypes was found. The rea-
son for this may be that religious in-group identification (as 
described by Mashuri and Zadaquisti 2013; 2014) has been 
found to be related to threat perceptions and different 
intergroup outcomes (Verkuyten 2007) more often than to 
national or ethnic in-group identification (for a general 
overview, see Ashmore, Wilder, and Jussim 2001). Moreover, 
in-group identification had a significant indirect effect on 
conspiracy stereotypes via symbolic threats, thus confirm-
ing the assumptions of the revised ITT, which proposes 
in-group identification as antecedent of intergroup threat. 
Moreover, the perception of an intergroup conflict invol-
ving a clash of civilizations was proposed as an additional 
antecedent to threats and conspiracy stereotypes. Earlier 
studies employing a clash-of-civilizations perspective as an 
explanatory framework for intergroup bias and support for 
violence showed that the perception of an intergroup con-
flict rooted in a clash of values is significantly related to 
negative intergroup outcomes (Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993; Sidanius et al. 2004). The 
results of this study contribute to a better understanding of 
this research by adding conspiracy stereotypes as a further 
consequence of a value-clash narrative, as well as by 
demonstrating that the clash narrative is significantly 
related to higher levels of threat perceptions and, via sym-
bolic threats, significantly related to conspiracy stereotypes. 
As expected, the variable clash of civilizations was strongly 
related to symbolic threats. However, it also showed a sig-
nificant yet weaker effect on realistic threats. Therefore, 
considering both types of threats simultaneously, as sug-
gested by the integrated threat theory, is implemented in 
this study by examining the clash-narrative as a possible 
antecedent of threat. 
In agreement with previous studies (Sidanius et al. 2004; 
Sidanius et al. 2015), the clash perspective was found to be 
significantly associated with in-group identification. The 
results suggest that individuals with higher levels of 
in-group identification and a right-leaning political orien-
tation are more prone to believe in Islamophobic con-
spiracy stereotypes. On the basis of previous findings 
suggesting a semantic similarity of Islamophobic con-
spiracy theories to clash-of-civilizations attributions (Benz 
2011; Shomann 2014), I expected clash of civilizations to 
have a direct effect and an indirect effect (via threat) on 
conspiracy stereotypes. The results confirm both the direct 
effect and an indirect effect via symbolic threat, suggesting 
partial mediation. 
Finally, the findings indicate that lower education is sig-
nificantly and positively related to threats and conspiracy 
stereotypes. The negative effect of participants having a 
higher level of education still holds after controlling for 
mediation via threat, thus suggesting partial mediation. 
Belief in Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes seems to 
decrease as the level of the participants’ education increases.
Overall, the findings confirm the expectation that belief in 
conspiracy theories as an intergroup outcome is directly 
related to symbolic threat perceptions and the perception 
of a conflict involving a clash of civilization. Additionally, 
symbolic threat mediates between in-group identification, 
the perception of an intergroup conflict involving a clash of 
civilizations, ambiguity intolerance, education, and con-
spiracy stereotypes. In sum, the full model accounted for 68 
percent of the total variance found in the Islamophobic 
conspiracy stereotypes. The overall results confirm that the 
revised ITT is appropriate for explaining belief in con-
spiracy theories.
5. Limitations and Future Research 
Certain limitations of this study should be addressed in 
any future research. First, the relatively small sample con-
sisted mainly of students, so the results are not represen-
tative of German society as a whole. Future studies could 
test the relationships in a more representative study. 
Another limitation is that data acquisition was conducted 
via an online survey, which is a relatively new method in 
the field of scientific research. The obvious advantage of 
online surveys is to reach respondents more quickly and 
cost-effectively than is possible using traditional methods. 
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Online surveys also have been shown to decrease social 
desirability, due to their anonymity (Kreuter, Presser, and 
Tourangeau 2009). On the other hand, online surveys must 
be kept very brief in order to ensure a high response rate 
(for an introduction to the online survey method and a dis-
cussion, see Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2008). Finally, 
the high percentage of explained variance in the dependent 
variables (68 percent) may be inflated by the common 
method variance of the survey procedure.
Based on the findings of this study, future research could 
expand the scope of the antecedents to threats and dif-
ferent intergroup outcomes by assessing the effect of 
further potential personality characteristics (Stephan et al. 
2009). Moreover, alternative explanatory frameworks for 
intergroup conflict, such as the counter-dominance per-
spective (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007; Sidanius et al. 2004) 
and generalized personal ideologies (for example, the con-
spiracy mentality from Imhoff and Bruder 2014) could also 
be analyzed in the context of threats and conspiracy the-
ories involving high-power outgroups (for example, in the 
case of system conspiracy). 
Additionally, Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes could be 
assessed with a broader scope than was done in this analy-
sis (four items only). Finally, future studies should explore 
the relationships between Islamophobic conspiracy stereo-
types, anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim prejudices, and Isla-
mophobic behavioral intentions.
6. Conclusion
To sum up, the findings indicate that participants have 
relatively low adherence to Islamophobic conspiracy 
stereotypes, which is an encouraging finding. Nevertheless, 
approximately 9 percent of the respondents indicated that 
they were not certain that an Islamophobic conspiracy did 
not exist and approximately another 8 percent indicated 
that they believed in an Islamophobic conspiracy to some 
degree. While this is certainly not an alarming amount, we 
must keep in mind that the sample in this study consisted 
mainly of well-educated respondents and does not necess-
arily reflect the views of the general population. Future 
studies with a more diverse sample may provide different 
results.
The results imply some possible practical actions to reduce 
intergroup tensions. In the context of integrating Muslims 
and Islam into German society, the results suggest that a 
predominantly culturalistic perspective on intergroup 
relations with essentializing and monolithic social cat-
egorizations (for example, “culture clash between the West 
and Islam”) in conjunction with a low tolerance for ambi-
guity (“The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals, 
the better”) and strong in-group identification (“I am proud 
to be a German”) explained much of the variance in inter-
group threat perceptions as well as in adherence to Islamo-
phobic conspiracy stereotypes. In light of these results, 
public policy and public debate on the subject would be 
well advised to avoid the pitfalls of reductionist, black-and-
white explanations of intergroup relations and should 
instead support more inclusive in-group narratives (Mus-
lim and German), with an emphasis on the positive aspects 
of cultural diversity in an immigration country. This 
should help mitigate intergroup conflict perceptions and 
subsequently, support the integration of Muslims and Islam 
in Germany. 
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